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ADVICE AND DISSENT: DUE PROCESS OF
THE SENATE
Luis Kutner*
The Watergate affair demonstrates the need for a general resurgence of
the Senate's proper role in the appointive process. In order to understand
the true nature and functioning of this theoretical check on the exercise of
unlimited Executive appointment power, the author proceeds through an
analysis of the Senate confirmation process. Through a concurrent study
of the Senate's constitutionally prescribed function of advice and consent
and the historical precedent for Senatorial scrutiny in the appointive process,
the author graphically describes the scope of this Senatorial power. Further,
the author attempts to place the exercise of the power in perspective, sug-
gesting that it is relative to the nature of the position sought, and to the na-
ture of the branch of government to be served. In arguing for stricter
scrutiny, the author places the Senatorial responsibility for confirmation of
Executive appointments on a continuum-the presumption in favor of Ex-
ecutive choice is greater when the appointment involves the Executive
branch, to be reduced proportionally when the position is either quasi-legis-
lative or judicial.
But as the clerk moved slowly and deliberately on, through the rest of the
A's, John Baker of Kentucky and the B's on through the C's and the two
D's-"Yes," said Stanley Danta quietly, and "No," said John DeWilton
loudly after-the E's and the lone F, Hal Fry, who said "No!" emphati-
cally, on down the alphabet to the M's and O's and P's and Arly Richard-
son, whose "Yes!" came with a certain spiteful air, it was obvious that
nothing could stem the tide. The press gallery began to stir with a great
restlessness, and long before the clerk came at last to "Mr. Wilson!" and
the tension suddenly burst in a roar of excitement, the wire-service reporters
were already long gone with their FLASH. SENATE DEFEATS LEF-
FINGWELL.
Allen Drury, Advise and Consent 599 (1959).
INTRODUCTIONA CURIOUS kind of drama was played out when, on Decem-
ber 17th, 1973, William B. Saxbe was confirmed as Richard
Nixon's fourth Attorney General-a drama for which the
script was written two hundred years ago. The seeming rancor and
friction between the Senate and the President obscures the fact that
* Member, Illinois and Indiana Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the
editorial assistance of Stanley Griffith, a member of the DePaul Law Review Staff.
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the Senate has not stood in the way of the President's appointments
very often. In the first nine months of 1973, approximately 42,000
names of prospective appointees were sent to the Senate for con-
firmation and most received rubber stamp approval. In the first
year of President Nixon's administration, he made 73,759 appoint-
ments (all but 4,633 were military) and every one of these was
approved with little or no controversy. As a matter of fact, the
only significant setbacks the President has suffered were with re-
spect to the appointments of Clement F. Haynesworth, Jr. and
G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court, George M. Godley to
the office of Undersecretary of State, Robert F. Morris to the Fed-
eral Power Commission (a vote to recommit on the floor of the
Senate), and L. Patrick Gray, III, to the office of Executive Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (nomination withdrawn after
severe questioning in the Senate Judiciary Committee). In short,
the President has had relatively little difficulty securing Senate ap-
proval of his choices for judicial, administrative, and regulatory of-
fices. 1 This article will examine the legal, political, and constitution-
al processes which bear upon the President's power of appointment.
Concurrently, the Senate confirmation process will be evaluated,
with a view towards understanding the true nature and function of
this theoretical check on the exercise of unlimited executive
appointment power.
There is no question that the Senate has the power, the right
and, indeed, the duty to reject a nominee offered by the President
in proper cases. Article II, section 2, of the Constitution states
that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ...."2
While presidential appointments of "officers" are generally un-
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, § 4, at 2, col. 5.
2. This includes offices in the Cabinet and independent agencies, which are es-
tablished by law. What constitutes an "officer" within the meaning of article H,
section 2, preoccupied some of the early decisions, but generally it encompasses a
position in government with duration, tenure, emolument, and duties. United States
v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).
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lawful and without effect unless subjected to the Senate's power
of advice and consent, Congress may vest the power of appointment
of such -an "officer" solely in the President, a department head,
or the courts.8 Conversely, Congress may, through passage of leg-
islation subject any executive officer to its power of advice and con-
sent.
4
The power of the Senate to confirm officers nominated by the
President is an important element in a government based on the
separation of powers. In his study of the Senate, Lindsay Rogers
has noted that "if the Senate did not have the right to advice and
consent, . . . the executive's own resource would be too great,"'
adding that "senatorial confirmation of appointments, though it di-
vides responsibility, is probably a valuable check." However,
3. Presidential appointment of "officers" must generally be subjected to the
Senate's power of advice and consent. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2; United States v.
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51-52 (1851); 18 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 409 (1886); 18
Op. ATr'y GEN. 98 (1885). See also Mimmack v. United States, 97 U.S. 426, 437
(1878).
Congress may vest the power of appointment of an "officer" solely in the Presi-
dent, a department head, or the courts. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880);
Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-68 (D.D.C. 1973); Collins' Case, 14 Ct.
Cl. 568 (1878).
4. Recent efforts on the part of Congress to reassert its authority over the Of-
fice of Management and Budget illustrate that a determined President may thwart
Congressional efforts by vetoing the legislation designed to accomplish this goal. The
House of Representatives passed a bill to abolish the present OMB directorship
and deputy directorship and to create two identical posts requiring Senatorial con-
firmation on May 1, 1973. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, at 13, col. 1. The Senate
substituted the House version for its own (passed in early February) on May 3.
N.Y. Times, May 5, 1973, at 21, col. 4. There is little doubt that the Congress
was motivated by presidential impoundment of funds and by the central role in these
decisions played by OMB. Further, the effort had been branded an "axe Ash" drive
because the incumbent director Roy L. Ash would be forced to go before the Sentate
if he was to remain in office. President Nixon vetoed the bill on May 18 and
referred to the legislation as a "backdoor" assault on presidential authority. He
said it ". . . would be a grave violation of the fundamental doctrine of separation
of powers . . ." and that these positions ". . . cannot reasonably be equated with
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts for which confirmation is appropriate .... . N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1973, at 1, col. 4. On May 22 the Senate voted to override, 62-
22; but the next day the House vote fell forty votes shy, 236-178. N.Y. Times,
May 24, 1973, at 1, col. 4. On June 13, 1973, an effort to append the OMB
confirmation bill (H.R. 3932) to an extension of the debt ceiling failed for pro-
cedural reasons. 119 CONG. REC. H4652-60 (daily ed. June 13, 1973). Thus the
power of Congress to subject an office to its advice and consent power may be sub-
ject to presidential veto.
5. L. ROGERS, THE AMERICAN SENATE 27 (1926) [hereinafter cited as ROGERs].
6. Id. at 250.
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Thomas Jefferson, writing to Samuel Kercheval in 1816, advanced
the following argument:
Nomination to office is an executive function. To give it to the legisla-
ture as we do, is a violation of the principle of separation of powers. It
swerves the members from correctness, by temptations to intrigue for of-
fice themselves, and to a corrupt barter for votes, and destroys the respon-
sibility by dividing it among a multitude. By leaving nomination in its
proper place, among executive functions, the principle of the distribution
of powers is preserved and responsibility weighs with its heaviest force on
a single head.7
While the separation of powers doctrine certainly requires that
the executive and the legislature be independent of one another,
the Constitution prescribes that in certain matters both branches
shall cooperate. The Constitution deliberately delegates a portion
of the executive power of appointment to the Senate. These execu-
tive powers assigned to the Senate in the appointment process are
described in article II, which deals with Presidential powers, rather
than in article I, which enumerates the powers of Congress." In
an analogous way, the Constitution makes the President a part of
,the legislative arm of government by conferring on him a veto pow-
er over legislation passed by Congress. Thus, the Senate's "negative
on appointments" is similar -to the President's veto on legislation. 9
As Charles L. Black, Jr., of Yale Law School, has stated, "[n]othing
anywhere suggests that some duty rests on the Senator to vote for
a nomination he thinks unwise, any more than a duty rests on the
President to sign bills he thinks unwise."'10  If the Senate cannot
refuse to confirm officers, -then the President cannot veto a bill.
It is as simple as that.
The Senate's advice and consent power serves other valuable
functions. Exercise of the power provides an opportunity for leg-
islative scrutiny of executive actions and policy.'" Questions may be
7. 15 WRrrN4s OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37 (E.A. Bergh ed. 1907).
8. D. BmtmAN, IN CoNGoEss ASSEMBLED 361 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
BERMAN].
9. 2 G. HAYNEs, ThE SmATE oF THE UNITED STATES 753 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as HAYNES].
10. C. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nomi-
nees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 659 (1970).
11. An example of such scrutiny is provided by the following testimony of Feb-
ruary 22, 1972, in an exchange between Senator Birch Bayh and Attorney General
designate, Richard G. Kleindienst:
1974]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:658
posed to a prospective officeholder regarding possible legislative
changes. 12  Participation of the Senate may also provide some meas-
ure of executive accountability.' 3  Furthermore, Senators may in-
dividually or collectively use the advice and consent power to cast
symbolic votes, intended as expressions of protest against policies
or as a form of censure.' 4  More recently -the advice and consent
Bayh:
Do you believe the attorney general has the power to order electronic
surveillance without a court order?
Kleindienst:
Yes, under the national security provisions of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Act.
Bayh:
Is there a distinction between foreign and domestic threats to national
security?
Kleindienst:
No. Under domestic threats, we are talking about subversives, not
people with differing ideologies.
Bayh:
Regardless, what is wrong with getting a neutral person (a court) to
issue a warrant for the surveillance?
Kleindienst:
Judges do not have the knowledge to make decisions on when national
security is endangered. Only the President has ....
Questioning continued on subjects ranging from capital punishment to enforcement
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 30 CONG. Q. 452-53 (1972). See also HEARINGS
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON THE NOMINATION OF LOUIS PATRICK
GRAY III TO BE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, EXEC. REPT. 91-
331 4-19 [hereinafter cited GRAY HEARINGS] for a detailed statement of the nominee
on the operation of the FBI.
12. See, e.g., GRAY HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 262-69. As a result of the hear-
ings on William E. Colby to head the Central Intelligence Agency, John C. Stennis
announced a full-scale review of the laws governing the CIA, and Stuart Symington
stated that the Security Act of 1947 which created the Agency contained "little
loopholes" which permitted the Agency to supervise a secret war in Laos and to
engage in other unauthorized clandestine activities. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1973', at
3, col. 1.
13. The recent confirmation hearings on the nomination of Dr. Henry Kissinger
to be Secretary of State forced the nominee to respond to questions regarding his
role in placing telephone taps on the phones of seventeen persons. Stuart Syming-
ton grilled Dr. Kissinger on his role as advisor to the President and the decision
to conduct secret bombing raids into Cambodia and to falsify records sent to the
Senate. The Senators quizzed him on his future dual role as both a Cabinet officer
and presidential advisor and seemed satisfied with the answer that he would not
invoke the privilege attending the latter position to avoid answering to Congress in
his capacity as a Cabinet officer. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
14. Senator Fred R. Harris announced his vote against Richard Kleindienst would
be to protest the Justice Department's handling of antitrust matters which he be-
lieved had caused "an inordinate concentration of economic power." 30 CONG. Q.
1370 (1972). Harris cast the lone "nay" vote on Lewis F. Powell's nomination to
the Supreme Court on the grounds that he believed Powell to be an "elitist," without
662
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power has been utilized as a device to wrest power and concessions
from the President.' 5 These ancillary considerations may weigh
just as heavily in a decision to confirm or reject as the nominee's
fitness for office.
The constitutional provision requiring that all officers be appoint-
ed with the advice and consent of the Senate demands more than
a mere Senate vote to confirm or reject; it requires that the Senate,
which shares in the appointment power, be consulted by the Presi-
dent before a nomination is made.' 6  Because the Constitution im-
regard for the little man. 29 CONG. Q. 2532 (1971).
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted on July 11, 1973, to "indefinitely
postpone" the vote on G. McMurtrie Godley and to ask that Secretary of State Wil-
liam Rogers give Godley a post unrelated to Southeast Asia. Godley, nominated
to be Undersecretary of State for East Asian Affairs, had been Ambassador to Laos
and had participated in the implementation of the administration's policy there.
Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright said the Committee did not doubt Godley's
qualifications but rejected him because of his identification with policies which had
been "an unmitigated failure." It was admitted at the hearings that Godley had
assisted in the selection of bombing targets in Laos and had advised the use of the
CIA to command a clandestine army there. A similar protest over William H. Sulli-
van to be Ambassador to the Philippines failed to secure more than three votes.
N.Y. Times, July 12, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
The nomination of Peter Brennan as Secretary of Labor, Elliot Richardson as
Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, Jr. as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
James P. Schlessinger as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Casper Wein-
berger as Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, and James T. Lynn as Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development were held up by the Democratic caucus
in protest over the Nixon administration's Vietnam War policies. This maneuver
in the Senate, majority leader Mike Mansfield explained, was not seen as a move
to extort a change in policy but rather as a symbolic act of protest. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1973, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973, at 4, col. I.
15. Senator James E. Abourezk urged the Senate to withhold approval of all
presidential nominees and to cut off funds for White House staff to attempt to re-
capture authority from the President. He accused the President of exceeding his
powers in the conduct of the war in Vietnam and in impounding money appropri-
ated by Congress. "The Constitution gives us two ultimate weapons, the power of
the purse and the right to advise and consent on appointments. We must now
make full use of both." 119 CONG. REc. 5621-23 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1973) (remarks
of Senator Abourezk).
Although there has generally not been much sentiment for going so far, the con-
firmation of Elliot Richardson as Attorney General was preconditioned on his ap-
pointment of a "Watergate special prosecutor," despite the fact that Richardson had
already been confirmed three times in four years. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1973, at
6, col. 3.
16. J. HARRIs, THE ADviCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 12-13 (1953) [herein-
after cited as HARMs]. The tradition of consulting with the Senate dates to the
appointment of Benjamin Fishbourn by George Washington. Fishbourn was to be
in charge of naval operations in Savannah, Georgia. However, the two Senators
from Georgia had other candidates in mind, and their efforts led both to the first
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poses upon the Senate the function of passing on appointments, it
is not only a Senator's right, it is his solemn duty under the Con-
stitution to pass on the qualifications of all those appointed to of-
fice. Charles Black, an advocate of a strong senatorial role in the
appointment process, argues:
In the normal case, he who lies under the obligation of making up his
mind whether to advise and consent to a step considers the same things
that go into the decision whether to take that step. In the normal case,
if he does not do this, he is derelict in his duty. . . . He who merely
consents might do so perfunctorily, though that is not a necessary but
merely a possible gloss. He who advises gives or withholds his advice on
the basis of all the relevant considerations bearing on decision.17
The advice of the Senate is involved here-and no Senator should
confirm an individual unless willing to appoint them.
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
According to Charles S. Hyneman, it was the intent of the found-
ing fathers to give the Senate "full participation in the political proc-
ess of choosing men for public office," or else they would have
so worded the Constitution to indicate that the Senate could only
approve or disapprove.' The framers of the Constitution indeed
intended that the Senate exercise an important role in the appoint-
ment power and that its function should not be nominal or perfunc-
tory.
The power of advice and consent to appointments was granted
to the Senate by article II, section 2, of the Constitution, as a check
on executive power. There was strong objection, particularly in
the smaller states, to vesting this power in the President alone, for
it was assumed he would come from the more populous states. The
debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicated a strong
body of opinion which feared that if the President were given the
sole power to make appointments, it would lead to monarchy.'" The
debate rated between those who favored a strong central govern-
Senate rejection of a presidential appointee and to a tradition of consultation. Id.
at 40-41.
17. Black, supra note 10, at 658-59 (emphasis in original).
18. C. HYNEMAN, BuREAuCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 179 (1950).
19. Hyman, With Advice and Consent . . ., N.Y. Times, July 5, 1959, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 9 and 28 [hereinafter cited as Hyman].
664 [Vol. 23:658
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ment and those who feared it.20 It was argued that the "safe
course" was to center the appointment power in the Senate. This
view was opposed by men, like Alexander Hamilton, who advocated
strong executive power. They wished to avoid a repetition of the
abuses they had observed under the Articles of Confederation when
the State legislatures alone had the power to appoint.2'
The founders, in their effort to create a nation, engaged in a
constant process of compromise which led them finally to adopt
a compromise, giving both the President and the Senate a share
in the appointment power. This compromise established a safe-
guard against unfit executive appointments by providing for a three-
step appointment process in which the Senate played a key role :22
First, nominations were to be made by the President. Second, the
"assent" of the Senate was called for. Finally, there was the appoint-
ment and commissioning of the appointee by the President.
Gouverneur Morris, who had previously favored appointment
solely by the executive, supported the compromise provision in
these words: "As the President was to nominate, there would be
responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be se-
curity. . . ." Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth who reported to
the Governor of Connecticut on this compromise between the large
20. See HAmRs, supra note 16, at 17-35 and debates cited therein for more de-
tailed history of the art. II, section 2, compromise. Benjamin Franklin warned, "No
new appointments would be suffered as heretofore in Pennsylvania unless it be re-
ferred to the Executive; so that all the profitable ones will be at his disposal. The
first man put at the helm will be a good one. Nobody knows what sort may come
afterwards. The Executive will always be increasing, here as elsewhere, till it ends
in Monarchy." John Rutledge stated that he was "by no means disposed to grant
so great a power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too
much toward Monarcy." And George Mason declared:
The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new ap-
pointments shall be referred to him. . . . We are Mr. Chairman, going
very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Gov-
ernment, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. . . . The peo-
ple will never consent. . . . We could never agree to give up all the
rights of the people to a single magistrate.
Id. at 22. Roger Sherman maintained that the Senate would provide better security
for proper choice, saying, "It would be composed of men nearly equal to the Execu-
tive, and would of course have more wisdom. They would bring into their delib-
erations a more diffuse knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for candi-
dates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magistrate." Id. at 28.
21. Hyman, supra note 19, at 28.
22. Id.
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and small states, indicated that "[t]he equal representation of the
States in the Senate and the voice of that branch in the appoint-
ment to offices will secure the rights of the lesser as well as the
greater States."'23  Alexander Hamilton, stated in The Federalist Pa-
pers that it was the intention of the founders to restrain the Presi-
dent's power to dispose honors and emoluments:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I an-
swer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful,
though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon
a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent
the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family con-
nection, from personal attachment, or from a view of popularity. . . . It
will be readily comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole dispo-
sition of offices would be governed much more by his private inclinations
and interests than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice
to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body,
and that body an entire branch of the legislature. 24
Hamilton, however, did not feel that the Senate would have great
influence over nominations and appointments. In Number 66 of
The Federalist he wrote, "[t]here will, of course, be no exertion
of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice
of the Executive and oblige him to make another; but they cannot
themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice [of the
President] . ... "I It did not take long for history to prove
Hamilton wrong. The Senate at once demanded that President
Washington consult with them before making a nomination. In
fact, this is what the Constitution had actually contemplated. Sena-
torial confirmation, as Joseph P. Harris concludes in his book
Advice and Consent of the Senate, "has provided the kind of pro-
tection against bad appointments which the framers anticipated. 26
The power of the Congress to advise and consent to appointments
has been narrowly construed and will not be extended by implica-
tion to include the power of Congress to require by statute that
it be consulted when an officer is removed. In other words, arti-
23. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 26, as cited in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 79 (M. Farrand ed. 1911 ).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (New American Library ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (New American Library ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
26. HARRIS, supra note 16.
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1974] DUE PROCESS OF THE SENATE
cle I, section 1 is a broad grant of executive power to the President.
Neither the impeachment power of article I, section 3, clause 7,
read in combination with article I, section 4 (the impeachment
clause), nor article II, section 2 alone, will be read to intrude on the
President's power to remove civil officers. Article II, section 2,
will be read narrowly;2 7 and article II, section 4, will be construed
as a grant of concurrent power. The power to remove is inci-
dent to the power to appoint. 8 But Congress may delimit the Pres-
27. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
para. 7 "The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments .. " and para.
8 "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from office .. "
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Con-
viction of Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." But see the
debates of the founding fathers regarding abuse of the removal power by a President
quoted in In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 239-42 (1839):
Mr. Lawrence . . . "If the president abuses his trust, will he escape the
popular censure? And would he not be liable to impeachment for displac-
ing a worthy and able man, who enjoyed the confidence of the people."
Mr. Madison . . . 'The danger then consists merely in this, that the presi-
dent can displace from office a man whose merits require that he should
be continued in it ... and [what are] the restraints that operate to pre-
vent it? In the first place, he will be impeachable by the house, for such
an act of mal-administration; for I contend, that the wanton removal of
meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from
his own high trust." Not one gentleman who participated in the debate
dissented from these views. We hold this to be sound constitutional doc-
trine. To assert the contrary, is to confound power with right, and in-
volves the absurdity of making every exercise of power a rightful and law-
ful exercise.
38 U.S. at 240. Similarly, the Court went on to say that if the President abused
the veto power, he would be liable for impeachment. Likewise if he sold political
favors.
mhe act then does not depend exclusively for its legality merely upon
the fact that it is within the power which the party possesses. An abuse
of legal authority is illegal, an abuse of constitutional power a high misde-
meanor. In the opinion of some of the most eminent men our country
has produced, the very act which is the subject of our present consideration
constitutes an impeachable offense. ...
Fortified in our positions by this array of authority, [Lord Coke, Chancel-
lor Kent, Judge Story] we have felt no hesitation in asserting that the act
of removal attempted to be exercised in this case, is a clear abuse of
power, if the authority indeed exists; is a palpable violation of duty, and
subjects the offending party to impeachment, as for a high misdemeanor.
38 U.S. at 341. The Court went on to hold that the defendant judge in this case was
not amenable to mandamus in view of the fact that the appropriate remedy was
impeachment.
28. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 258-60 (1839).
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ident's removal power in cases where full independence from the
executive authority is the essence of the office and the regulatory
officer exercises quasi-judicial power. 29  Congress may constitu-
tionally restrict, by way of statute, the executive's choice of nomi-
nees by imposing explicit qualifications, such as limiting the choice
to persons of a race, sex, occupation, or even to a list suggested
by Congress or some other group. 0
The appointment need not be by the President, head of depart-
ment, or by the courts, if the duties of a nominee are but occasional
and temporary. Otherwise, all appointments must be by advice and
consent or vested by law with the President, a department head
or with the courts.81 Furthermore, Congress may constitutionally
prescribe a method of filling vacancies temporarily until such time
as the President shall nominate a successor. However, if Congress
does not make any statutory provision for temporary succession, the
Constitution compels the President to submit the officer's appoint-
ment to the Senate. 2
A final word about a curious extra-constitutional feature of the
appointment process is worthy of note. Although article I, sec-
tion 2 makes no provision regarding the role of the House of Rep-
resentatives, it is not uncommon for members of the House to ex-
press their opinions on nominees, to petition the Senate regarding
their qualifications, and to testify with respect to the advisability of
appointments.8 8  An even more curious situation is reflected in
29. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
30. For a complete list of the types of restrictions which may be imposed by
Congress on the appointing power, see Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265-
74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890). During World War II,
Franklin Roosevelt created the National War Labor Board which seemingly exercised
considerable authority over labor-management relations questions. Yet it was held
that such a non-statutory agency was for the sole purpose of advising the President
and heads of departments in formulation of enforceable orders, hence not an office
within the meaning of article II, section 2. Employers Group of Motor Freight
Carriers v. National War Labor Bd., 143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
32. Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973). See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§
3345 et seq. (1970). For a list of other such statutes, see Williams v. Phillips, supra
at 1370-71. See also, for a summary of the evolution of judicial responses to illegal
executive acts and some recurring problems, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827 (1957).
33. A recent example of this was seen with the appointment of Judge G. Harrold
Carswell. The efforts of several blocs of representatives figured prominently in
[Vol. 23:658
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the unwritten code of congressional courtesy, which provides that
the Senate shall defer to -the House Subcommittee on Internal
Security, which in turn holds hearings on all matters related to
loyalty and security. This practice was more common in the hey-
day of McCarthyism, but a recent example of the importance of this
aspect of the appointment process was provided by the successful
efforts of Representative John Ashbrook to delay the appointment of
Helmut Sonnenfeldt -to the office of Undersecretary of the Treas-
uryYs4 It is apparent that the undefined interstices of the process
are frequently as important as those aspects of the process which
are incorporated into written form.
The constitutional matrix which the appointment process operates
is a delicate one combining politics, law, and custom. The remain-
der of this article will examine the ways in which the constitutional
drama is played out.
HISTORIC ROLE OF THE SENATE IN SALIENT CASES
Cabinet Officers
Regarding the question of the latitude the President should
have in making nominations to important offices, the custom
has become well established that the President has the right to select
the members of his cabinet-and that the Senate will not interfere
even though it may be of the opposition party. 5  "Although the
Senate takes very seriously its responsibility for screening nomi-
building sentiment for his defeat. Particularly vocal was a group of Black Congress-
men headed by John Conyers, Jr. 29 CONG. Q. 905-08.
34. John Ashbrook, a conservative opponent of the Nixon-Kissinger d6tente
policy, successfully blocked Sonnenfeldt's appointment by announcing his intention
to investigate Sonnenfeldt's background. Ashbrook's chief assistant in the
enterprise was a fellow by the name of Otto Otepka a former proteg6 of the
late Joseph McCarthy. Otepka's charge was that Sonnenfeldt had leaked classified in-
formation to the press as long ago as 1954. Although the Senate Finance Committee
was nominally in charge of the hearings, Ashbrook's committee was permitted to
insist on extensive hearings of its own. All this, despite the fact that Richard
Nixon and Dr. Kissinger felt the appointment to be crucial to the establishment
of liaison between the National Security Council (for which Sonnenfeldt had worked
as an advisor to Kissinger) and the Treasury Department which would figure prom-
inently in trade and monetary negotiations with the Soviets, the People's Republic
of China and Europe. No visible Senate opposition presented itself, but the unwrit-
ten code of courtesy prevailed. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
35. RoGERS, supra note 5, at 29.
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nees to the most important Federal offices," Daniel Berman points
out,"it is a rarity for confirmation to be withheld from one who has
been named to a Cabinet position. '' 31 Typically, nominations to
the President's cabinet have been confirmed without much hesita-
tion."7 The Senate, out of courtesy to the President, has not
been disposed to be very critical of a presidential appointment to a
cabinet position. Senator Fessenden spoke of senatorial courtesy
in these words:
The general idea of the Senate has been, whether they liked the men or
not, to confirm them without any difficulty, because in executing the great
and varied interests of this great country it is exceedingly important that
there should be the utmost harmony between those who are charged with
that execution. 38
Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa also expressed the general attitude
of the Senate toward cabinet nominations when he said in 1939,
"[o]ne of the last men on earth I would want in my cabinet
is Harry Hopkins. However, the President wants him. He is
entitled to him . . . . I shall vote for the confirmation of Harry
Hopkins. .... -
The President, as a rule, should feel free to select members of
his "official family" on the basis of whatever criteria he wishes;
cabinet members have been described as "extensions of the Presi-
dent." Members of the President's cabinet are his own personal ad-
visers and are closely associated with him. The heads of the de-
partments are responsible to the executive; and, in turn, the Presi-
dent is held accountable for what they do.4" Berman claims that
"the Chief Executive's unqualified power of removal is an index
of the absolute trust and confidence that should characterize the
relationship."4
The criteria for removal from office in no way relate to the cri-
teria for confirming appointments. While Congress has no power
to remove a cabinet officer except by impeaching him and convict-
ing him of "Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misde-
36. BERMAN, supra note 8, at 362.
37. HAYNES, supra note 9, at 761. But see notes 13-15 supra.
38. HAYNES, supra note 9, at 761.
39. Quoted in Griffin, The Broad Role, 2 PROSPECTUS 289 (1968).
40. Hyman, supra note 19, at 30.
41. See BERuMAN, supra note 8, at 362.
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meanors" (article II, section 4), nothing in the Constitution im-
plies that the reasons for removal shall apply or have any relation
to the reasons for refusing to confirm. The logic of the argument
would be that the Senate could never exercise its right to refuse
to confirm unless the appointee were guilty of treason, bribery or
other high crimes and misdemeanors.
4 2
Although Sidney Hyman states that unless a President is given
the freedom to choose a cabinet of his own preference, he is de-
nied "a definite center of responsibility for what issues from the
Executive," he concludes that it does not follow that every cabinet
nomination should be automatically confirmed. Hyman insists that
the phrase "with advice and consent" does not mean that the
Senate has a passive role in the confirmation process:
It does not imply that its work is done when it goes through the cere-
monial motions of a formal hearing, and that it must then concur in the
President's choice. Rather, the Senate has an active role to perform
throughout. And the knowledge that it has that role and stands ready at
all times to perform it is in itself an inducement for the President to
choose "qualified" men .... 43
There is no doubt that the Senate has the power to refuse to
confirm a cabinet official. There have been a number of instances
when the Senate has "kicked up its heels" and rejected a cabi-
net appointment. The first such instance occurred in 1834, when
the Senate refused to confirm President Jackson's nominee, Roger
B. Taney, as Secretary of the Treasury. A more recent example is the
rejection of Lewis L. Strauss' nomination to the office of Secre-
tary of Commerce." Thus, there is historical precedent for sena-
torial scrutiny and rejection of cabinet nominees.
President Calvin Coolidge's nomination of Charles B. Warren to the
office of Attorney General in 1925 is frequently cited as a most sig-
nificant case involving strict senatorial scrutiny and rejection of a
cabinet nominee. Mr. Warren was the head of a prominent Detroit
law firm and president of the Michigan Sugar Company. He had
previously served as United States Ambassador to Japan and Mexi-
co.4 No cabinet nomination had been rejected by the Senate since
42. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text, supra.
43. Hyman, supra note 19, at 28-30.
44. See BERMAN, supra note 8, at 362.
45. HARRIs, supra note 16, at 260.
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1868, and the New York Times predicted that "Mr. Warren's nom-
ination would be confirmed by a considerable majority after the op-
posing senators have recorded their protests." But, two days later,
a majority of the Senate opposed the confirmation of Warren by
a vote of 41 to 38.40
The "gravamen of the objection" to Warren was that he had
been closely associated with the American Sugar Refining Company,
which had been charged by the Federal Trade Commission with viola-
tions of the antitrust laws. The Senate feared that the Sherman
Act would not be vigorously enforced if Warren were confirmed.
Senator Walsh of Montana opened the debate on the floor of the
Senate, as follows:
I subscribe to the doctrine that under all ordinary circumstances the
nominations of the President of the United States for members of the Cab-
inet should be confirmed by the Senate without delay and that opposition
of a political or factional character ought to be discountenanced. The
President is charged ...to take care that all the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted, and he ought to be given the greatest liberty possible in the selec-
tion of those who immediately under him are to carry out his policies.
• .. Nevertheless ...the framers of our Constitution ...provided that
. [t]he responsibility ... for the appointment of all Federal officers
where confirmation is necessary rests upon this body jointly with
the President of the United States. . . . It is indisputable that we share
that responsibility and that we must assume it. .... 47
Walsh continued by saying that "a man may have led the most
exemplary life and yet be totally unfit for the duties and responsi-
bility of high official position."4" Walsh then raised the objection
that Warren "ought not be made Attorney General .. .because
for years he was a representative .. .of the Sugar Trust, one
of the most offensive and oppressive trusts with which the American
people have unfortunately been familiar in the present and past
generations,"" and concluded his remarks with the assertion that
if the nomination were confirmed, Congress should repeal the
Sherman Antitrust Act.50 Senator Reed claimed, "Those of you
who propose to stand here to-day and uphold the hands of this trust
46. Id. at 119-20.
47. 67 CONG. REc. 18 (1925).
48. Id.
49. 67 CoNG. REc. 19 (1925). See also HARmis, supra note 16, at 119-24.
50. 67 CONG. Rnc. 32 (1925).
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organizer, this trust promoter, this trust conspirator, thinking you
are doing a service to wealth, are in the end doing it a disservice
. .. .,, Indeed, the Senator went considerably further:
An insidious argument has been whispered around this Chamber ...
that the Senate has no responsibility; that we should say to the President:
"This is your office. Do with it as you please. Handle it as you might
your own private property, and then in the end we will hold you respon-
sible."
A falser doctrine was never promulgated. It is false in fact, false in
theory, false in its logic, and infamous to a degree that can scarcely be
portrayed.
There is no such thing as a presidential Cabinet. That is a mere name,
a figure of speech .... 52
Following the unexpected rejection of Warren, President Coolidge
renominated him.5a In issuing a statement, Coolidge expressed
the hope "that the unbroken practice of three generations of per-
mitting the President to choose his own Cabinet will not now be
changed and that the opposition to Mr. Warren, upon further con-
sideration, will be withdrawn in order that the country may have
the benefit of his excellent qualities and the President may be un-
hampered in choosing his own methods of executing the laws."5
However, the Senate disregarded the plea -and again rejected War-
ren.55 "That the President should be unhampered is, generally
speaking sound doctrine," according to Lindsay Rogers who at the
same time recognized that "the Senate has a responsibility which
it cannot avoid. Whether the standard set up in the Warren case
was extreme or no[t] is beside the point; if the Senate believes
-that a nominee is unfit it should interfere; a reasonable presidential
discretion should not be presidential license."' 56  The Senate has
a primary obligation to judge every facet of a nominee--his char-
acter, integrity, emotional stability, competence, and whether he has
any conflicts of interests-in order to determine if he is qualified to
51. 67 CONG. REc. 94 (1925).
52. Id.
53. HARRIs, supra note 16, at 260.
54. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1925, at 1, col. 7.
55. HAius, supra note 16, at 124.
56. RocEms, supra note 5, at 31.
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be entrusted with a cabinet office.57  A Senator is justified in voting
against any nominee unless he regards that nominee as the best-
qualified person in the country for the job.58
The concern for even-handed administration of justice evidenced
in the Warren confirmation fight has resurfaced recently in the con-
text of nominations to such sensitive positions as the office of At-
torney General and the Director of the FBI. Due to an increasing
awareness of incursions on civil liberties, there is a growing recog-
nition of the dangerous potential for abuse of power. In the hear-
ings on the nominations of Richard Kleindienst to the office of Attor-
ney General,"' L. Patrick Gray, III, to the office of Director of
the FBI, 60 Clarence Kelley to the same post,61 and Elliot Richardson
57. Hyman, supra note 19, at 30. An analogous situation confronted the Senate
Agriculture Committee when passing on the nomination of Earl Butz. The oppo-
nents charged that Butz favored corporate interests over those of the family farmer,
he was a director on four food producing chains, had been an outspoken opponent
of relief to the small farmer and as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in the Eisen-
hower administration was identified with Ezra Taft Benson's "adapt or die" poli-
cies. Butz ultimately cleared the committee by an eight to six vote. 29 CoNG.
Q. 2450. The only recent rejection of a sub-cabinet officer was that of G. McMurtrie
Godley, Undersecretary of State. Supra note 14.
58. Hyman, supra note 19, at 30.
59. See discussion, supra note 11. Considerable time in the hearings was taken
up on the nominee's role in the settlement of the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Corporation divestiture case. The Judiciary Committee finally voted 11-4 to
recommend confirmation despite a sharply worded minority report. Kleindienst
strenuously denied any knowledge of any wrongdoing in the handling of the ITT
affair, but the minority views of the committee criticized him for a "predictable
and presentable" appearance of impropriety in the acceptance by the Committee to
Re-elect the President of a large contribution during negotiations over settlement.
The majority was convinced however that Kleindienst's representations that the
White House had in no way participated in the settlement were true. 30 CONG. Q.
913, 972, 1014, 1103-04 (1972).
60. Questioning of L. Patrick Gray, III, ranged over a wide variety of topics
including: his July 25, 1969 speech to Department of HEW appointees on the need
for loyalty to the Nixon administration above all else; his political speech-making
on behalf of the President while Acting Director; the handling of the ITT-Dita
Beard affair; the investigation regarding the break-in of the Watergate Hotel and
potential involvement of White House personnel; the storage and dissemination of
FBI files, and surveillance of political dissidents and the news media. GRAY HEAR-
INGS at 91-94, 103-13, 129-38, 139-45, 151-75, 231-68, and 461-539. On April
28, 1973, Gray resigned as Acting FBI Director, acknowledging the truth of rumors
that he had destroyed files from the desk of E. Howard Hunt, Sr. This evidence
was given to him by John D. Ehrlichman, presidential advisor on domestic affairs
and John W. Dean, Counsel to the President, with the instructions that this was
"political dynamite" and should "never see the light of day." N.Y. Times, April
28, 1973, at 1, col. 8 and at 14, col. 6.
61. In testimony in answer to questions regarding his political neutrality, Clar-
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to the office of Attorney General,6" the questioning of the nominees
has focused heavily on their views in the area of civil liberties and
on their political neutrality.
What this represents is not an intrusion of the Senate on the pre-
rogatives of the executive, but rather a regeneration of the historic
responsibility of the Senate to check the appointment power of
the President. The skepticism born of the troubled times of Water-
gate and post-Vietnam War is encouraging. The presumption running
in favor of presidential nominees appears to be waning in favor of
a policy of requiring real and substantive evidence that the
appointee is worthy of the public must have in their governmental
officials.
Ambassadors
The Senate has shown its restraint in not attempting to wrest
control of the selection of ambassadors from the hands of the ex-
ecutive. Here, too, the situation is clearly a matter of custom and
decorous procedure, based on the rationale that any President has
the right to pick envoys to foreign powers, as they are essentially
his personal representatives in the nations to which they are assigned.
ence Kelley stated that "he never bowed to political pressure and I don't intend
to start." He was questioned regarding surveillance of persons not accused of
crimes. Kelley agreed with Committee suggestions that it might be wise to have
a "watchdog" committee of Congress to act as a check of FBI activities and said
he was not flatly opposed to submission of a line item budget. Both suggestions
were strenuously resisted by Kelley's predecessors. Senator Edward Kennedy
quizzed Kelley on how he would respond to requests to make campaign speeches,
requests to supply data to the White House staff, and to destroy documents "de-
scribed as 'political dynamite.'" All these questions reflected Senatorial fears that
Kelley might permit partisan political considerations to affect the administration of
the Bureau. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1973, at 26, col. 6. The Senate was obviously
convinced by Kelley's answers because on June 26 after unanimous Judiciary Com-
mittee approval, the Senate voted 96 to 0 to confirm. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973,
at 32, col. 3.
62. Despite the fact that Elliot Richardson had been confirmed on three separate
occasions to other posts within the Nixon cabinet within the preceeding four years,
Senator John V. Tunney spearheaded a successful drive to block the nomination of
Richardson to head the Justice Department until he and the President acceded to
Senate pressure to name a special prosecutor to investigate Watergate-related crimes.
Richardson's personal friendship with John Ehrlichman, Charles Colson and other
alleged principals in the Watergate scandal were given as the reasons for insisting
on a neutral investigative arm. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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President Eisenhower's nomination of Charles E. Bohlen as Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union in 1953 is a notable exception to
the Senate's general policy of restraint. The nomination of Bohlen
was debated on and off in the Senate for a month before his final
confirmation." On February 27, 1953, Mr. Eisenhower had submit-
ted to the Senate the name of Bohlen, a career Foreign Service
Officer, as nominee to the post in Russia.64 Bohlen, an expert in
the Russian language, was also considered in many quarters to be an
expert in Russian affairs. In spite of these qualifications, there
was strong opposition to his appointment, particularly among mem-
bers of the President's own party. This opposition stemmed from
Bohlen's participation (ostensibly as an interpreter) in the Yalta Con-
ference, and the subsequent denunciation by Republicans in their
1952 campaign platform of the secret political agreements made
at Yalta. Called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
to be questioned by its members, Bohlen refused to repudiate the
Yalta Conference agreements." Further, it was announced to the
Committee that Secretary of State Dulles had "cleared" Bohlen
after having himself reviewed a summary report by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. The report, Dulles stated, "left no doubt of Mr. Boh-
len's loyalty and security." 6  Because of allegations that Bohlen's
security file contained derogatory information, a number of sena-
tors demanded that the FBI files be examined by the senators them-
selves. 7
Some of the senators began to organize a movement to refuse
confirmation of Bohlen.6" Senators McCarthy and McCarran charged
that Bohlen was a "poor security risk," and Styles Bridges, President
pro tempore of the Senate, declared that there would be "for-
midable" opposition to the appointment. 9 Others argued that Boh-
len could be said to symbolize Yalta, since he had, in the words
of Senator Hickenlooper, "defended almost in terms of brilliant
63. R. YoUNG, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 208 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
YOUNG].
64. HARIS, supra note 16, at 296.
65. W. WHITE, THE TAFT STORY 233 (1954) [hereinafter cited as WHITE].
66. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 296.
67. YoUNG, supra note 63.
68. WHrrE, supra note 64, at 233.
69. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 295.
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diplomatic victory what I consider to be a diplomatic disaster, and
he has criticized severely those who have criticized what was done
at Yalta."70
Robert A. Taft, speaking on behalf of the Administration, in sup-
port of the Bohlen appointment, called McCarthy's suggestion that
Dulles come before the Committee and be placed under oath "an
uncalled for suggestion," asserting that "Mr. Dulles' statement not
under oath was just as good as Mr. Dulles' statement under oath, as
far as I am concerned." Senator Taft also opposed the sugges-
tion that the Committee call a security officer, R.W. Scott McLeod,
who claimed Dulles had "overruled" him in clearing Bohlen. "Af-
ter all," said Taft, "we have before us a peculiar kind of question
with reference to the file. . . gathered by the FBI containing every
kind of material with reference to what Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. Z have
said."'" The Senator then proposed the deputation of two mem-
bers from the Foreign Relations Committee to review the file, for
to open all confidential and classified files to the members would
be to destroy the FBI.72 "It is a file which never should be
published and put in general circulation," Taft stressed. "Just how
far it could go among Senators without becoming a matter of gen-
eral circulation is a question I cannot answer." 73
Senator Taft reluctantly agreed to look into the FBI summary of
the Bohlen file with Senator Sparkman.74 He reported to the
Senate on March 25 that, after having read through the summary,
he would have asked "very strenuously" to see the raw files, or
at least of portion of the testimony of the informants, if there were
anything in the summary which seemed ambiguous or suggested that
something which might have been in the raw files was omitted. But
he could not find anything of that nature in the summary; the infor-
mation seemed to be complete. Insofar as Taft knew, no one
had suggested that there was anything in the files which was not
fully covered in the summary. Taft pointed out that "[t]he so-called
16 pages of derogatory information relate to entirely separate mat-
70. 99 CONG. REc. 2388 (1953), as cited in YOUNG, supra note 63, at 207-08.
71. 99 CONG. REC. 2201 (1953), as cited in WHrrE, supra note 65, at 235-36.
72. 99 CoNG. REC. 2201-01 (1953), as cited in HARRIs, supra note 16, at 298.
73. 99 CoNG. REC. 2201 (1953), as cited in WmmE, supra note 65, at 236.
74. WnrrE, supra note 65, at 236.
1974]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:658
ters." The greater part of the file consisted of statements of poli-
tical differences with Bohlen on principles of foreign policy; state-
ments from persons who thought he had played a larger part in
the Yalta conversations than others; and statements suggesting that
he was closer to Acheson than these person would have liked. Al-
though Taft had political disagreements with Bohlen, he had confi-
dence in his morality and reputation.7 5
Senator Sparkman corroborated the findings concerning the
general good character of Bohlen:76 "The opposition to Bohlen was
driven down to its irreducible core," William S. White observed.
"The opposition found itself . . .powerless to state its case with
any practical coherence. '77  Bohlen was confirmed by a vote of 74
to 13, with 11 Republican and two Democratic senators voting
"No.",97 8
The deference the Senate has shown toward ambassadorial
choices of the President has been called into question more recently
over the issue of using ambassadorial appointments as "political
plums." It has long been a tradition of our political system to
appoint ambassadors based on the ambassador's loyal monetary sup-
port of the party in power.79  This strange form of "dollar di-
75. 99 CONG. REC. 2277-78 (1953).
76. 99 CoNG. REC. 2280 (1953), as cited in HARRIs, supra note 16, at 297. An
analogous situation arose during the recent confirmation hearings on Dr. Henry Kis-
singer's nomination to be Secretary of State. J. William Fulbright led off the ques-
tioning in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and determined that, in response
to leaks of confidential information, Kissinger had agreed to procedures designed
to determine the source of the leaks. Seventeen persons including four newsmen
had "taps" placed on their phones. Kissinger testified as to his later acquired
knowledge regarding the procedure for handling the information secured. However,
the Justice Department would not agree to bearing the FBI files on the "taps." Sen-
ator Clifford Case stated: "I think it is very clear that the committee will not be
in the position to act on the nomination until that report has been received." N.Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 5 and at 10, col. 1. A memo prepared by the
Justice Department was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but when
this proved inadequate, a compromise was worked out whereby Senators Case and
Sparkman would review the full file and report back to the Committee after com-
plete discussions with Attorney General Richardson, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral William D. Ruckelshaus, and Kissinger. The compromise cleared the way for
confirmation. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
77. WHITE, supra note 65, at 238-39.
78. 99 CONG. Rac. 2392 (1953), as cited in HARRIs, supra note 16, at 299.
79. Ambassador to France, John N. Irwin, gave $14,000 in 1968, $16,500 in
1970 and $52,500 in 1972. His future was boosted by his brother-in-law's contribu-
tions of $49,000 in 1968, $22,000 in 1970 and $300,000 in 1972. John Krehbiel
1974] DUE PROCESS OF THE SENATE 679
plomacy" has not been disturbed because both political parties have
done it."0 However, this quaint custom may have seen its demise
as the result of -the appointment of Ruth I. Farkas to the position
of ambassador to Luxemburg on February 27, 1973. In testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mrs. Farkas conceded
that she had contributed $300,000 to -the re-election campaign.
However, what prompted the Senate to delay her confirmation
was the fact that $100,000 was contributed after the election and
$100,000 was given in January and February-after the Commit-tee
to Re-elect the President had announced a five million dollar sur-
plus.8' Although Mrs. Farkas was ultimately confirmed, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee instructed its staff to draft a policy state-
ment on ambassadorial appointments. Included in that statement
would be a $10,000 ceiling on contributions for appointees and a
limit of fifteen percent on appointments drawn from noncareer For-
eign Service ranks.8 2
Again, a healthy trend may be noted in the Senate's unwilling-
ness to permit -the quaint custom of deference to presidential ap-
pointment power to continued unexamined. Ambassadors not only
represent the Executive, they represent the entire country and ar-
ticle 11, section 2 gave the Senate the right and the duty to share in the
-appointment process.
went to Finland for $5,500 in 1968, $1,000 in 1970 and $12,500 in 1972. Anthony
D. Marshall went to Trinidad and Tobago for $25,000 in 1968, $1,000 in 1970 and
$49,500 in 1972. John P. Humes was named to be Ambassador to Austria for
$43,000 in 1968, $13,000 in 1970 and $103,500 in 1972. Vincent de Roulet spent
the first term in Jamaica in recognition of $44,500 in 1968-69 and $32,500 in 1972.
His father-in-law also contributed $28,000 in 1968, $32,000 in 1970 and $88,000
in 1972. Henry Catto, Jr. represents the United States in El Salvador and inci-
dently gave $10,750 in 1968; $2,000 in 1970 and $26,000 in 1972. Editorial, Auc-
tion, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1973, at 42, col. 1. One independent analy-
sis filed with the General Accounting Office reports that President Nixon's re-elec-
tion campaign received at least 1.3 million dollars from past and newly-named am-
bassadors. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1973, at 20, col. 3.
80. Franklin Roosevelt appointed Edward (Boss Ed) Flynn of the Bronx as en-
voy to Australia but it was quietly dropped because it was clear that it would not
clear the Senate. Maxwell Gluck was appointed by Dwight Eisenhower to head
the mission in Ceylon in recognition of his $20-30,000 contributions to the 1956
campaign; and the Senate confirmed him despite the fact that in testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Gluck admitted he could not pronounce
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's name and possessed, little knowledge of
Asia in general. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1973, at 3, col. 3.
81. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1973, at 20, col. 3.
82. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1973, at 3, col. 3.
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Independent Agencies
During the last half-century, independent commissions have been
created by acts of Congress to regulate the complicated national en-
deavors of government. Congress has provided, by law, for the type
of personnel on each new board, the scope of its power granted
to the body, and the manner in which his power is to be
exercised.8" While cabinet and diplomatic officers may be called
"servants of the President," the regulatory agencies are "servants
of the Congress," because they are created to carry out con-
gressional policy.84 Although the President should have relative
freedom in selecting his cabinet members, this broad executive pre-
rogitive should not extend to the selection of officers of independent
agencies. These agencies are entirely "independent" in the sense
that they are not subordinate to any executive department, and
hence have no particular connection with the President. The com-
missions have quasi-legislative powers, and are responsible to Con-
gress, not the Executive. The members of the commissions make
policy under their respective acts, and exercise legislative authority
to the same degree they exercise administrative authority. Because
the legislative body delegates such legislative power, the Senate
should retain control over those persons who are, in fact, its agents
in exercising that authority. The appointee should be responsible,
and feel responsible, to the Senate. In his full account of the
Senate's function of advice and consent, Harris examines these
commissions' "special relationship to Congress":
The function of the Senate in passing upon the nominations [to inde-
pendent regulatory commissions] is not limited to the technical qualifica-
tions of the nominee and his fitness for the office; it is appropriately con-
cerned with his stand on broad policies and the effect his appointment may
have upon the functioning of the commission. Often the character and
attitude of the officers who head the agency have as much to do with its
policies as the legislation under which it operates. The Senate must there-
fore consider whether a nominee to a regulatory commission is in sym-
pathy with the objectives of the laws which he will be called upon to ad-
minister, and whether he will support policies agreeable to the majority of
the Senate. 8 5
The contest over the confirmation of David E. Lilienthal as chair-
man of the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1947, is regarded by one
83. HAYNES, supra note 9, at 76.
84. Hyman, supra note 19, at 28.
85. HAuius, supra note 16, at 178.
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student of the appointment process "as one of the, most notable
cases in the history of the Senate." 6  John W. Bricker, the only
member of the Atomic Energy Committee to vote against confirma-
tion of Lilienthal, spoke of the co-equal responsibility of the Senate
in selecting a man for 'the Atomic Energy Commission, maintaining
that the Commission "is essentially an arm of the Congress, the
legislative branch, and in our consent we have a responsibility rising
almost to the level of the original appointing authority." '87 Objec-
tions to Lilienthal in the Senate centered around the belief that
he favored a constant extension of government power. Senator
Cain of Washington announced that Lilienthal was "a man whose
thirst for power and authority is unquenchable; '" 88  Senator
Bridges said, "[hie is a typical bureaucrat," with a "trappy, tricky
mind," and accused Lilienthal of running the TVA "like a
czar."8 9 Senator Wallace White of Maine also charged Lilienthal with
"dictatorial management" of the TVA.90 Another objection was that
Lilienthal was "soft" on issues connected with Communism. Sen-
ator Ferguson, speaking in opposition to Lilienthal's appointment,
stated that he had been too lenient with Communists employed by
the TVA and believed in "socialist aristocracy."91  Senator McKeller
of Tennessee attacked Lilienthal on the grounds of having appointed
three Communists to the AEC during his recess appointment (though
Senator Knowland emphasized that there was no evidence in the
record to substantiate that allegation).9  "With thousands of able
men from whom to choose," Senator Byrd asked, "why should
a selection have been made that has even a taint of some foreign
'ism' abhorrent to the American people?" '  And Senator Taft
stated that the confirmation of Lilenthal's appointment would rep-
resent "a real threat to our national safety."'9 4  Nevertheless, Lil-
86. Id. at 168.
87. Id. at 165.
88. 93 CONG. REc. 2860 (1947), as cited in HARMS, supra note 16, at 165.
89. 93 CoNG. Rac. 2952-56 (1947), as cited in HARRIS, supra note 16, at 166.
90. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1947, at 1, col. 4, as cited in HARRis, supra note 16,
at 163.
91. 93 CONG. REc. 2595 (1947), as cited in HARRIS, supra note 16, at 165.
92. HARms, supra note 16, at 166.
93. 93 CoNG. REc. 3011 (1947).
94. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 164 n.21.
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ienthal was vindicated by a strong speech delivered by Senator
Vandenberg, who said that while he was initially prejudiced against
the appointment, he could find no basis, after weeks of testimony,
for the charge that Lilienthal was sympathetic to Communism, and
was led by evidence "and a just regard to urgent public welfare
... to recommend Mr. Lilienthal's confirmation. . ."' The
Senate confirmed Lilienthal by a vote of 50 to 31, though he would
probably have been rejected were it not for Vandenberg's in-
fluence.96
The Senate's searching inquiries into the political philosophy and
economic background of nominees has resulted in the rejection of
the recent appointment of Robert Morris to the Federal Power Com-
mission." However, the significance of -this defeat pales some-
what when one considers that it was only after a long string of vic-
tories for the President-largely won by default. There has always
been a tradition for Presidents to try to shape regulatory agencies
to accord with their own objectives, but the Nixon Administration has
had far more success in achieving this goal than any administration
in recent history. Considerable controversy surrounded the nomina-
tion of Lee R. West, a little known state district court judge of
Ada, Oklahoma, to head the Civil Aeronautics Board. Members of
the Senate had hoped for the re-appointment of Robert T. Murphy,
whose twelve-year term expired on January 1, 1974. At the urging
of American Airlines with home offices near Ada, Oklahoma, the ad-
ministration sought to replace Murphy because of his votes in favor
of increased competition, against mergers, and in favor of con-
sumers.'
8
95. 93 CONG. REC. 3108 (1947). See also HARRIS, supra note 16, at 167.
96. 93 CONG. REC. 3241 (1947). See also HARRIS, supra note 16, at 168-69.
97. 119 CONG. REC. S11094-11110 (daily ed. June 13, 1973). The debate and
vote on Robert Morris is an interesting study in the conflicting opinions of members
of the Senate as to the appropriate role for the legislative branch in the appointment
process. Many members sought to convince their colleagues that the same deference
to presidential choice as exists with cabinet posts should prevail with respect to reg-
ulatory agencies. However, lead by Senators Magnuson, Moss, and Hart, those who
opposed this concept won out. They pointed to the fact that Morris had worked
for a law firm retained by Standard Oil for fifteen years. The specter of the regula-
tor and the regulated becoming one convinced the majority to demand from the
President that he appoint someone more representative of the consumer's point of
view. Morris' nomination was defeated by a vote to recommit to committee, 49-
44.
98. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
682 [Vol. 23:658
DUE PROCESS OF THE SENATE
To protect the agency from too much control from any one ad-
ministration, Congress generally vests agency members with long
terms, staggering the end dates and requiring bi-partisan member-
ship.9"  Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the leading observers
of the administrative process, said in a recent interview that little
difference remains between "independent" regulatory agencies
and administrative departments. "Congress still prefers independ-
ence and the President still prefers to have subordinates. . . . The
reality is not that different. The difference is much less than peo-
ple expect."'10
One tradition that has undercut the staggered term scheme is the
notion that chairmen serve at the pleasure of the President. Resig-
nations have also contributed to a decay of the legislative safeguards.
The result has been that within the first four and one-half years
of his administration, President Nixon has named twenty-eight of
the thirty-six posts on the six major regulatory bodies and has
named all six chairmen. An illustration of how little effect the
safeguard of bi-partisanship has is the case of Alfred T. McFarland
who was named to the Interstate Commerce Commission. He was
nominally a Democrat. However, severe Senate criticism was
voiced since McFarland had a history of supporting Republican candi-
dates. The White House withdrew the nomination, had McFarland
change his registration to Independent and resubmitted his name.
Senator Frank Moss said "[w]e could do nothing but confirm him.
* . . I don't like it, but I couldn't help but have some admira-
tion for the bold way they did it."''1
The most recent blow to the "independence" of independent
regulatory commissions was the decision by the Office of Management
99. The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of Congress circum-
scribing the President's removal power in the case of regulatory agencies. Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). This notion was expanded one
step further in the case of Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). In Hum-
phrey's Executor, the Court ruled that Congress may legislatively restrict removal in
instances where a quasi-judicial officer is involved; but in Weiner, where the law was
silent on the tenure and removal procedure, a member of the War Claims Board
was held to have been unlawfully discharged since the office was not part of the
executive branch, but rather intended to be independent. The essence of Hum-
phrey's Executor, said the Court, was the nature of the office and not the fact that
the legislature had provided for a specified term or a specified removal procedure.
100. N.Y. Times, supra note 98.
101. Id.
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and Budget to include certain regulatory agencies within administra-
tion-wide expenditure and personnel cuts. Senator Edward J.
Gurney termed this "sort of a new and far-reaching authority that
either did not exist or was not used before ... .
The question then becomes what is the Senate's proper role in
the face of such overwhelming tendencies toward absorption of reg-
ulatory agencies. The answer is, simply, that Congress must defend
its constitutionally granted powers jealously. It must look to itself
to reverse the atrophying prerogatives it once had. In short, it




What was said of the Senate's attitude toward making a more
thorough investigation of a nominee for a seat on a regulatory
agency than when a cabinet office or ambassadorship is at stake
is even more compelling in the case of judicial nominations. While
Charles Black sees "a clear structural reason for a Senator's letting
the President have pretty much anybody he wants" in executive
department posts because ,they "are his people," he explains that
"just the reverse is true of the judiciary. The judges are not the
President's people. God forbid! . . . They are as independent of
him as they are of the Senate ... ."o4 During the debate on
the Carswell nomination, Senator Frank Church expressed a similar
opinion:
Surely, the reasons why the Senate customarily applies a lenient stand-
ard to Executive appointments, giving the President so much latitude in
the selection of his own official family, are utterly lacking in relevance
when applied to the Supreme Court of the United States. Under our Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court, highest tribunal in the land, presides over an
independent judiciary, separate and apart from the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the Federal Government.' 0 5
The separation of the judicial power from the other two branches
of Government was a sound principle established by -the founder of
the Constitution and incorporated into every state constitution. An
independent and impartial judiciary is a basic concept of civilized gov-
102. See HARRIs, supra note 16, at 178; Hyman,,supra note 19, at 28.
103. BERMAN, supra note 8, at 363-64.
104. Black, supra note 10, at 660.
105. 116 CONG. REc. 8702 (1970).
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eminent, and is essential to assure the administration of equal jus-
tice under the law. A court whose decisions would be exactly what
a President demanded would be neither just nor impartial. The in-
dependence of the judiciary is unique, but then the American Con-
stitution is unique-a written constitution definitely limiting the pow-
ers of Government as they have not been limited in other countries.
Objections to individuals nominated by the President for member-
ship on the Supreme Court are usually made on the basis of fit-
ness for office, and the judicial philosophy of the nominees. The
philosophy of a Supreme Court nominee, in the view of Black, is
a factor in his fitness:
If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will make a judge whose service
on the Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator can do right only by
treating this judgment of his, unencumbered by deference to the Presi-
dent's, as a satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote.106
President Wilson's nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme
Court brought about one of the most celebrated Senatorial cQnfirma-
tion contests in history. No Supreme Court nominee-save Judges
Haynesworth and Carswell-has ever met with a stronger or more
determined opposition to his appointment.10 7  A large segment of
the bar thought Brandeis extreme and attempted to block his con-
firmation.108 It was feared that Brandeis, considered by his op-
ponents as an objectionable radical, a muckraking crusader, and a
socialist, would affect the generally conservative nature of the
Court. 0 While Brandeis had high ideals and great tenacity of pur-
pose, a memorial signed by Elihu Root and -three other past presi-
dents of the American Bar Committee stated that "taking into view
the reputation, character, and professional career of Mr. Louis D.
Brandeis, he is not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States.m 0
The Brandeis confirmation hearings held by the Judiciary Subcom-
mittee were quite extensive, covering a period of four months. The
106. Black, supra note 10, at 663-64.
107. HARis, supra note 16, at 99.
108. 116 CONG. REC. 17511, citing Commager, Choosing Supreme Court Judges,
162 NEW REPUBLIC 13 (May 2, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Commager].
109. HARRIs, supra note 16, at 100-01, 113.
110. Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 409 pt. 1,
1226 (1916).
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hearings were twice re-opened, and the proceedings filled two thick
volumes of more than 15,000 printed pages. In the contest over
Brandeis, the administration tried to avoid stressing his progressive
record or creating an impression of excessive Jewish and labor sup-
port. Finally the Committee voted 10 to 8 in favor of Brandeis' con-
firmation, May 24, 1916.111 The appointment came to a vote in
the Senate on June 1, and Brandeis was confirmed, 47 to 22.112
Every Republican Senator and one Democrat, Senator Newlands
of Nevada, voted against Brandeis."' Mr. Newlands explained his
vote, as follows: "I have great admiration for Mr. Brandeis as a
propagandist and publicist, but I do not regard him as a man of
judicial temperament. .... However, after Brandeis was on
the bench, even those who disagreed with him on social and econ-
omic issues came to regard him as an able and valued member of
the Court, whose social and economic insights represented a unique
contribution to the life of the Court.
When one comes to the matter of Judge Haynesworth or Judge
Carswell, the nomination of either man would have materially
changed the recent liberal character of the Supreme Court to a more
conservative, though not unduly conservative, Court. President Nix-
on announced that he would not appoint any judge to the Court
who held extreme liberal views."' The President had "set
about to reshape the Supreme Court," stated Senator Gurney of
Florida, in order to "restore to the High Court the dignity and
objectivity that once marked its deliberations and by doing so re-
store it to the esteem it once enjoyed with the American peo-
ple.""" Nonetheless, the mistake of Mr. Nixon, particularly in the
case of Carswell, lies in the fact that he approached the situation
from the wrong angle. In a letter, dated March 31, 1970, to Sen-
ator William Saxbe, the President wrote in regard to -the confirma-
tion of Judge Carswell:
What is centrally at issue in this nomination is the constitutional re-
sponsibility of the President to appoint members to the Court-and whether
111. HARRIs, supra note 16, at 113.
112. 53 CONG. REC. 9032 (1916).
113. HARRis, supra note 16, at 113.
114. 64 CONG. REc. 9032 (1916).
115. 116 CoN. REC. 17511 (1970), citing Commager, supra note 108.
116. 116 CONG. REc. 9957 (1970).
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this responsibility can be frustrated by those who wish to substitute their
own philosophy or their own subjective judgment for that of the one per-
son entrusted by the Constitution with the power of appointment. The
question arises whether I, as President of the United States, shall be ac-
corded the same right of choice in naming Supreme Court Justices which
has been freely accorded to my predecessors of both parties.
The fact remains, under the Constitution it is the duty of the President to
appoint and of the Senate to advise and consent. But if the Senate at-
tempts to substitute its judgment as to who should be appointed, the tra-
ditional constitutional balance is in jeopardy and the duty of the President
under the Constitution impaired.1 17
Senator Brooke responded to President Nixon's contention by
pointing out in the Senate chamber, "[w]e must never view the
nomination and confirmation process, as the Constitution has pre-
scribed, as anything less than a joint responsibility, and one which
we must take most seriously . . . . Separation of powers does not
mean the domination of one branch over another, but rather-in
this case in particular-a shared, co-equal responsibility."' ' 8
It appears that at the time the votes were taken on the nomina-
tions of Clement F. Haynesworth and G. Harrold Carswell more
Senators concurred with Senator Brooke in his insistence on Sen-
atorial responsibility in the confirmation process. The nomination of
Judge Haynesworth was criticized by opponents, including labor and
civil rights organizations, due to his conservative Southern back-
ground, and the allegation that the Judge had violated existing ethi-
cal standards in several corporate cases before him in which he had
a "substantial interest.""' The Haynesworth appointment was
voted down with 45 Senators voting for confirmation and 55 voting
against. 2 ' In the case of Judge G. Harrold Carswell, President
Nixon's nominee was attacked as being mediocre, racially biased, and
lacking in candor.' 2 ' The New York Times, commenting on Judge
Carswel's opinions, noted that he "finds few controversies that
cannot be settled by invoking some settled precedent"-though, as
Senator Gurney suggested, this was much more "a highly lauda-
117. 116 CoNG. REc. 10158-59 (1970).
118. Id. at 10160.
119. 116 CONG. Ruc. 15684-85 (1970).
120. 115 CONG. REc. 35396 (1969).
121. Editorial, Judge Carswell: The President's "Right of Choice," Wash. Post,
April 2, 1970.
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tory statement" than the "damning criticism" it was intended to
be. 2' The votes on the successful effort to recommit the Cars-
well nomination split much more closely along party lines. 128
Following the Haynesworth and Carswell defeats, President Nixon
successfully nominated Harry A. Blackmun (confirmed 94-0, May 12,
1970),"' Lewis F. Powell (confirmed 89-1, Dec. 6, 1971)128 and
William H. Rehnquist (confirmed 68-26, Dec. 10, 1971).126 The
only significant resistance posed was to Rehnquist. Liberal Sena-
tors Birch Bayh, Philip A. Hart, Edward Kennedy and John V.
Tunney filed separate opinions in the Judiciary Committee's report
due to reservations about Rehnquist's opinions on civil liberties and
particularly his views on wiretapping.' 2 T On December 8th, Senate
Minority Leader Hugh Scott filed a cloture petition to shut off de-
bate which failed by a vote of 52 to 42. On December 10th, Birch
Bayh moved to postpone consideration of the nomination until Jan-
uary 18th, 1972. The vote on the motion defeated it 70 to 22. The
opponents, conceding defeat, yielded the floor and the final con-
firmation vote was allowed to proceed.12 8
The deplorable practice had developed whereby -the Senate con-
firmed any presidential appointment to the Supreme Court unless
the nominee was found to be a thief or felon, or involved in a se-
rious scandal. For a number of years members of the Senate-in
many instances because a majority of them usually stood with the
President's party-approached appointments from the point of view
that unless it could be proven that a nominee was clearly incapable
of performing the duties of the office to which he was appointed,
he should be confirmed. George Galloway describes how, during
the early days of the Republic, nominations were approved on the
same day they were received; but today, when a unanimous consent
order is required to act upon a nomination on the very same day
it is reported out of committee, delay for greater deliberation should
be the norm in the Senate. 2  Writing in Prospectus, Senator
122. 116 CONG. REc. 9956 (1970).
123. 28 CONG. Q. 903 (1970).
124. 28 CONG. Q. 1271 (1970).




129. G. GALLOWAY, THE LEOISLAThE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 574 (1959).
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Robert Griffin completely dismisses the idea that since the Senate
has not used its power of advice and consent it is almost a "rub-
ber stamp." The Senator recognizes that "the power of any
President to nominate constitutes only one half of the appointing
process," and the "other half . . . lies within the jurisdiction
of the Senate. . . ." Thus, "[t]o assure the independence of
-the judiciary as a co-ordinate branch," Griffin reasons, " . . . it
is important to recognize that this power of the Senate with respect
to the judiciary is not only real, but it is at least as important as
the power of the President to nominate." 180
Certainly, one of the fundamental foundations of a democracy is
the high quality of its courts. Henry Steele Commager cites nu-
merous qualifications for a judge on the Supreme Court: legal eru-
dition, courage and independence, broad and generous social sym-
pathies, resourcefulness and imagination, and the ability to be a
great teacher of the law, politics, constitutionalism and philosophy.
But Commager allows that the most important quality is judicial tem-
perament-"the ability to judge issues dispassionately and imper-
sonally."'' Yet it is quite clear that the Court is an integral part
of the law making process. Therefore, it is not at all improper
to measure the nominee's qualifications by the Senate's view of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The Senate is not supplant-
ing the President's role in the appointive process-for truly it is a
shared responsibility. Passivity in the review of presidential nom-
inees has no place in the American constitutional scheme.
CONCLUSION
The appointment of officers of the United States is an Executive
function in which the Senate participates in an advise and consent
capacity pursuant to the mandate of article H, section 2, of the
Constitution. While the Senate's constitutional responsibility in the
appointment process may not be equal to that of the President, it
is of the same character, in that both the Senate and the President
must thoroughly investigate and evaluate nominees in order to fulfill
their respective constitutional duties.
130. R. Griffin, The Broad Role, 2 PfospEcrus 287-88 (1968).
131. 116 CONG. RE . 17512 (1970), citing Commager, supra note 108.
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The proposition that the Senate may not reject a nominee unless
he is a felon or is shown to have engaged in gross misconduct, con-
stitutes a total misconception of the Senate's constitutional role in
the appointment process. The Senate has the duty under article
II, section 2, to pass on a nominee's character, ability and gen-
eral competence and to confirm only those nominees found to be
qualified to assume the position for which they are nominated. Each
case must be decided on its own merits and be discussed and do-
bated in the Senate.
There is a slight presumption in favor of confirmation of the Pres-
ident's nominees, but this does not alter the Senate's duty to make
its own complete investigation and evaluation. Because Senatorial
resources are limited, it may be necessary for the Congress to leg-
islate a reduction in the number of positions subject to advice and
consent so that the Senate may give more complete scrutiny to
those positions regarded as most important. This reduction would
ensure that positions as important as Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget would not escape close scrutiny.
The strength of presumption in favor of a President's appointments
should be viewed conceptually as a continuum, with the presump-
tion increasing in strength as one moves along the continuum from
judicial appointees, through members of independent agencies, to
foreign envoys, and finally to cabinet and other executive officers.
The Senate's role in the appointment process increases as the
strength of presumption in favor of presidential nominees decreases.
There is a saying that a President is known by the appointments
he makes. George Haynes has asked, "[m]ay [not] a Senate
be known by the appointments it prevents?" 1 2  The majority
of the Senate has too readily confirmed executive appointments
in the absence of outstanding factors whch disqualify the nominee.
If a President makes poor appointments and the majority of the
Senate confirms them, then just as the President and the Senate
share constitutional responsibility in the appointment process, they
must jointly share responsibility for the quality of government this
nation will have.
132. HAYNES, supra note 9, at 753.
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